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Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate
change policy
Daniel H. Cole
Lack of progress in global climate negotiations has led scholars to reconsider polycentric approaches to climate policy. Several
examples of subglobal mechanisms to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions have been touted, but it remains unclear why they
might achieve better climate outcomes than global negotiations alone. Decades of work conducted by researchers associated
with the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University have emphasized
two chief advantages of polycentric approaches over monocentric ones: they provide more opportunities for experimentation
and learning to improve policies over time, and they increase communications and interactions — formal and informal, bilateral
and multilateral — among parties to help build the mutual trust needed for increased cooperation. A wealth of theoretical,
empirical and experimental evidence supports the polycentric approach.

T

he lack of progress in global climate change negotiations has
spurred scholars to examine workable, subglobal policies to
reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
The late Elinor Ostrom led the way in a report she authored in
2009 for the World Bank, calling for a more ‘polycentric’ approach
to climate governance1. Others soon followed suit 2–9. Whether referring to ‘polycentric approaches’, ‘building blocks’, ‘regime complexes’
or ‘bottom-up systems’, these authors all agree about the need to pay
more attention to existing and potential subglobal climate policies
that might, alone or in some combination, substitute for or supplement the existing United Nations (UN) regime and/or provide new
impetus to global negotiations. No one has yet offered a sufficient set
of reasons for believing that a polycentric approach might produce
a better climate outcome. This Perspective attempts to fill that gap.
Some scholars seem to have embraced polycentric solutions to
climate change almost in desperation because of the lack of progress in global negotiations, but others have long preferred it as a
matter of theory. Victor and Raustiala10 argued in favour of “regime
complexes” — defined as collective[s] of partially overlapping and
non-hierarchical regimes — over monocentric international legal
systems for plant genetic resources several years before Keohane
and Victor 3 made similar arguments about climate policy. Abbott 11,
citing Ostrom12,13, specifically referenced the pre-existing literature
on polycentric governance of common-pool resources.

The polycentric approach to policy

Ostrom’s1,13 own approach to climate governance was deeply rooted
in the polycentric approach that was pioneered by her husband
Vincent 14, and that became a central pillar of the ‘Bloomington
School’ of political economy 15. Ostrom et al.14 based the polycentric approach on a principle of subsidiarity according to which
government services are best provided at the lowest level of government consistent with their effective application. A polycentric
system is characterized by “the concurrence of multiple opportunities by which participants can forge or dissolve links among different collective entities... [P]articipants must be able to pick and
choose those producers and providers that are most appropriate to
each specific issue at hand”16. Instead of a ‘monocentric hierarchy’,

where governmental units at higher levels make all collective-choice
decisions, and units at lower levels simply follow commands from
above, “a polycentric system is one in which governmental units
both compete and cooperate, interact and learn from one another,
and responsibilities at different governmental levels are tailored to
match the scale of the public services they provide”1,4.
The ‘Bloomington School’ is associated with the Ostrom
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University. Throughout its 45-year history, the Ostroms and their
Workshop colleagues developed theories and conducted empirical
tests of collective action for resolving social and combined social–
ecological problems based in large part on the theory of polycentric governance. Years before she became famous as a scholar of
‘the commons’, Ostrom and her colleagues were designing and carrying out studies comparing ‘small’ (presumptively fragmented)
and ‘large’ (consolidated and presumptively more efficient) police
departments in Indianapolis and other cities. Those studies demonstrated that large-scale, consolidated police departments do not
always benefit from economies of scale and often suffer performance deficiencies compared with smaller policing units in metropolitan areas. These police studies informed Ostrom’s subsequent
work on natural common-pool resources, ranging from small forests to large irrigation systems, where the polycentric approach was
found to have substantial utility 1,12. Although much of her work on
common-pool resources focused on local resource-management
problems, Keohane and Ostrom17 explored how the polycentric
approach to governance might also successfully operate at the international level.
When Ostrom later turned her attention to the problem of climate
change1,13, she summarized the findings of her earlier applications of
the polycentric approach to problems of providing public goods (for
example, police services) and conserving common-pool resources.
A key factor running through several of those findings was that the
polycentric approach provides “greater opportunity for experimentation, choice, and learning” across levels of social organization4. She
also referenced its tendency to “enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the
achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes
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at multiple scales…”13. These conclusions are well established in the
‘Bloomington School’ literature, but Ostrom’s explanation was incomplete. She never fully explained how the polycentric approach could
improve climate outcomes by (1) creating more opportunities for
experiments and learning, and (2) building the mutual trust necessary for improved climate outcomes. Because much already has been
written about experimentation and learning in climate policy 1,13,18, the
emphasis here is on the widely neglected issue of trust-building.

Reputation

Trust

Level of communication

Experimentation and learning in climate policy

No one believes that the UN’s global climate policy has been successful. Yet it seems remarkably resistant to change, let alone replacement.
But it has never been “the only game in town”19. Several authors point
to numerous climate policies that have been, and are being, implemented at local, state, regional and national governments, and even
among private business associations1,2,4. These polycentric policies
multiply opportunities for communication, trust-building, policy
experimentation and learning.
Local-level governments have been experimenting with GHG
mitigation policies for many years now, and paying close attention to
what others have been doing. Ostrom13 writes about a 2005 conference in London attended by representatives of 18 large cities. They
compared notes on urban mitigation policies and reviewed the congestion tax introduced by the City of London in 2003. Non-exempt
motor vehicles entering London’s ‘Congestion Charge Zone’ must pay
₤11.50 each working day. The primary purpose of the tax is to reduce
city traffic and raise funds for London’s public transportation system.
To the extent that the congestion charge moves more commuters
from private to public transport, it also reduces carbon emissions.
Virtually all major cities have been watching London’s experiment,
and several, including Stockholm20 and Milan21, have already replicated it. In 2007, when Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed a congestion charge for New York City, it was blocked in the state legislature
despite widespread support 22.
Elinor Ostrom1 observed that “all policies adopted at any scale
can generate errors, but that without trial and error, learning cannot occur.” If the Kyoto Protocol were in fact ‘the only game in town’,
the extent of learning, and prospects for improving policies, would
be quite narrow. A polycentric system of climate policies necessarily
entails a greater number of discrete policy experiments from which
policymakers at various levels of governance might learn valuable lessons, including about designing monitoring systems to ensure policy
compliance1. The growing literature on experimentalist governance,
including at the global level, supports Ostrom’s arguments18,23,24.
Relatedly, Ostrom1 observed that efforts “to improve levels of collective action to overcome social dilemmas must enhance the level
of trust of participants that others are complying with the policy or
else many will seek ways of avoiding compliance.” And she noted
that “[i]f the only policy related to climate change was adopted at the
global scale, it would be particularly difficult to increase the trust that
citizens and firms need to have that other citizens and firms located
halfway around the globe”1 are reciprocating.

Building mutual trust through a polycentric approach

Trust has been absent in the global-level climate negotiations, which
Scott Barrett 25 has aptly described as a “free-rider game”. Formal and
highly structured meetings involving thousands of individuals—the
United Kingdom’s official delegation to the most recent meeting of
the parties in Warsaw reportedly 26 numbered 45—may not always
provide the best fora for facilitating communications that lead to
trust-building and cooperation. Trust is not the same as blind faith,
where parties simply sit down and ‘do the right things’ according to
someone’s moral compass. Rather, trust is earned by mutual commitments that are not overly costly to monitor 27. Thus, Ronald Reagan’s
famous admonition to “trust, but verify” is redundant. Verifiability is
part and parcel of trust.

Level of cooperation

Net benefit

Reciprocity

Figure 1 | Core relations in repeated social dilemmas. Adapted from
Ostrom34,35.

One hypothesis of the polycentric approach to climate policy
is that social–ecological problems can be successfully resolved,
whether those problems are conceived as iterated Prisoners’
Dilemmas28,29 or Assurance games30–32, only if mutual trust among
resource users can be cultivated over time through communication and cooperation across a range of issues. This hypothesis is
consistent with Keohane’s33 observation that “Intergovernmental
relationships… characterized by ongoing communication among
working-level officials, ‘unauthorized’ as well as authorized, are
inherently more conducive to information-exchange and agreements than are traditional relationships between internally coherent
bureaucracies that effectively control their communications with
the external world.”
The diagram in Fig. 1, adapted from Ostrom34,35, describes relations between communication, trust and cooperation in repeated
social dilemmas. Similar to Sen’s30 Assurance games, she locates “the
core of a behavioural explanation” for mutual cooperation on social
dilemmas in the trust individuals place in others, the investment
those others make in developing and maintaining reputations for
trustworthiness, and the probability that participants adopt norms
of reciprocity (such as tit-for-tat strategies)35. If initial levels of cooperation are sufficiently high, then individuals learn to trust one
another, developing new, or reinforcing existing, norms of reciprocity and establishing reputations for trustworthiness that may lead to
higher levels of cooperation in future interactions. This dynamic,
reinforcing aspect of the cycle is not entirely clear in Ostrom’s original depiction of these ‘core relationships’. My own contribution is to
make manifest the dynamic process of trust-reinforcement by (1)
directly incorporating communication as a variable affecting trust,
(2) describing a direct feedback from the level of cooperation to reputation, and (3) describing another direct feedback from ‘net benefit’
to the ‘level of cooperation’. The chief point of the figure is altered
only slightly: levels of communication can affect trust levels, which
substantially determine levels of cooperation. Positive outcomes of
cooperation include enhanced reputations for cooperators, which
can lead to increased trust and reciprocity, and subsequently even
higher levels of cooperation.
The goal of communicating and developing a reputation for trustworthiness is to build ‘relationship capital’, as it is known in the literature on international business alliances36, which can alter a game’s
expected payoffs by raising the subjectively perceived probabilities
of mutual cooperation. Communication does not inevitably lead to
higher levels of trust, of course. But simple communication has too
often been denigrated as ‘cheap talk’35, which, ironically, can prove
extremely valuable for improving cooperation.
The hypothesis about communication, trust and cooperation is
further supported by a substantial body of research. In a variety of
experimental settings, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker found “communication … to be a very effective mechanism for increasing the
frequency with which players choose joint income-maximizing
strategies, even when individual incentives conflict with the cooperative strategies”27. Their experiments confirmed, more generally, “the
power of face-to-face communication in a repeated common-pool
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resource dilemma where decisions are made privately”27, particularly
where costs of communication are low. More recently, a field experiment conducted by Cardenas et al.37 revealed that repeated communications help to establish the identities of ‘conditional cooperators’
in a group, “who can then develop common knowledge that they
will play the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game.” Extraction
rates from common pools fell significantly as a direct consequence of
the repeated communications.
Although the existing empirical and experimental literatures do
not provide much insight into relations between the scale or scope of
communications and cooperative outcomes, especially in the context
of international negotiations, several discrete studies provide some
indication that the scale, scope, duration and context of communications can matter. Aumann and Hart 38, for example, show that ‘long
cheap talk’ (that is, communications over a longer period of time)
helps to promote cooperation better than ‘short cheap talk’. Barrett 25
suggests that quieter and more confidential conversations might
be advantageous, observing that the recent trend toward greater
democracy and transparency in international negotiations has not
necessarily promoted cooperation. Compromise, he notes, is not so
easy when it must be done in full public view. Such assessments warrant the hypothesis that formal or informal, one-on-one, or smallgroup communications might have a significant positive impact on
climate negotiations.
In a literature review of public good and common-pool resource
experiments, Ostrom35 explored six potential reasons that communication increases cooperation. It:
(1) facilitates the development of socially optimal strategies;
(2) allows for exchanges of promises;
(3) “increases mutual trust and thus affects expectations of others’
behaviour”;
(4) adds value to payoffs;
(5) reinforces norms; and
(6) promotes development of ‘group identity’.
Ostrom found “building trust… to be a key link in the communication–cooperation connection”, and that “the efficacy of communication is related to the capability to talk on a face-to-face basis.”

The US–China Climate Change Working Group

But can increasing the frequency and types of interactions among
parties increase levels of mutual trust and cooperation in the climate
change context? Despite more than two decades of formal meetings
under the auspices of the UNFCCC, most major emitting countries
including China and the United States have remained (generally
speaking) non-cooperators on GHG mitigation. In April 2013, however, those two climate belligerents established a joint US–China
Climate Change Working Group with the explicit goal of fostering
cooperation and facilitating bilateral and multilateral negotiations39.
How many people outside the climate policy community have even
heard about this group, let alone follow its ongoing negotiations?
The Working Group’s first official report 40 enunciated three
main goals, the second of which relates directly to the thesis of this
Perspective: “both sides appreciate that advancing concrete action
on climate change can serve as a pillar of our bilateral relationship,
build mutual trust and respect, and pave the way for a stronger overall collaboration.” In June 2013, the Working Group picked some
low-hanging fruit by agreeing to a ‘phase-down’ of emissions of
hydrofluorocarbons — potent GHGs, but not of great importance
to either the United States or the Chinese economy, especially after
the European Union prohibited its member states from funding
hydrofluorocarbon-based Clean Development Mechanism projects
in China, which had been a major source of fraud4.
No one realistically expected the US–China Climate Change
Working Group to yield significant climate-policy benefits in a
116

matter of a few months or even years. But already the regular
meetings seem to be paying dividends. On 11 November 2014, US
President Obama and Chinese President Xi signed a climate-change
agreement, “worked out quietly” over the course of nine months41.
Pursuant to that agreement, the United States set a new target of
reducing its carbon emissions by 26–28% from 2005 levels by 2025,
and China committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030
(or earlier), while increasing use of non-fossil fuels to 20% of its
total energy portfolio42. These are, of course, only pledges of future
reductions; it remains to be seen whether the pledges will be fulfilled. Future governmental action is especially difficult to guarantee
in democratic republics such as the United States, where presidential elections can lead to policy reversals.
An explicit motivating factor for both the United States and
China was to “galvanize efforts to negotiate a new global agreement
by 2015”41. At the very least, the agreement puts more pressure on
other non-cooperating countries, including India and Canada. That
the world’s two largest emitters of carbon, and two of the existing
global climate regime’s greatest belligerents, entered into a bilateral
agreement with the aim of improving global negotiations amounts
to an implicit endorsement of the polycentric approach to climate
governance, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the global negotiations. And, interestingly, although the deal was done behind closed
doors, in complete secrecy, no one seems to be complaining about
a ‘democracy deficit’.
The US–China climate agreement was not hammered out in the
course of a couple of days by the two principals. It was worked out
over many months by their agents, lower-level government officials.
Unfortunately, trust and cooperation between negotiators does not
always translate into trust and cooperation among their principals,
the individuals who sign agreements and ratify treaties. Moving
trust from the negotiators (that is, agents) to the principals depends
on processes of ‘intra-organizational bargaining’43. But whatever the
difficulties of such processes, it remains clear that if trust does not
first develop between negotiators, its development among the principals is unlikely. Principal-agent problems are, at least at some level,
unavoidable for any proposed solution to a given collective-action
problem. The key empirical question is whether principal-agent difficulties are so serious as to undermine any negotiated solutions,
whether local, national or global.

Private actors in polycentric governance

The polycentric approach is not solely concerned with cooperation between public agents at different levels of government. It is
about governance, not governments, and encompasses private as
well as public actors. Those private agents include GHG emitters,
non-governmental organizations, small groups of concerned citizens, even families who might decide, for example, to install solar
systems at their homes and take other steps to minimize their carbon footprints1. It is easy enough to point to private-sector actors
that have taken significant actions to reduce GHG emissions. The
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
was founded in 1992, just before the Earth Summit in Rio, by a
Swiss entrepreneur who “believed that business had an inescapable
role to play in sustainable development” (http://www.wbcsd.org/
about.aspx). Today, the WBCSD represents the CEOs of more than
200 companies globally. Its Executive Committee includes CEOs
from multinational corporations such as Unilever, Toyota, Infosys,
Royal Dutch Shell and China Petrochemical. Recently, the WBCSD
partnered with scientists from the Stockholm Resilience Centre
and policy analysts at the World Resources Institute to establish
ACTION2020, a programme designed to develop ‘business solutions’ that will ensure global mean temperatures do not increase
by more than 2 °C by 2050. According to its Action2020 Overview
(http://go.nature.com/2VmDLt), those solutions will be measurable,
scalable, replicable, beyond business as usual and, ultimately, good

NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | VOL 5 | FEBRUARY 2015 | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange

© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved

PERSPECTIVE

NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE2490
for business. On other matters relating to sustainable development,
it has partnered with the World Wildlife Fund, the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the Earthwatch Institute,
among many others.
The WBCSD’s activities should not be dismissed blithely as
‘greenwash’, but should be understood, as Najam44 has argued, as
a serious offer from the private sector to participate in finding
effective solutions to problems such as climate change. At the very
least, by taking climate science seriously and recognizing a need
for private-sector cooperation with regulators and non-governmental organizations on climate solutions, the WBCSD makes it
more difficult for other firms and business associations to deny or
downplay the climate change problem. In addition, member CEOs
of the WBCSD who claim to take the climate change problem seriously and promise to participate in solutions implicitly open themselves and their firms to public and media criticism, should they
fail to live up to their promises. Finally, the WBCSD reminds us
that no matter who imposes what climate change regulations, the
vast majority of actual GHG emission reductions will ultimately
come from private actors (at least in countries where most major
emitting firms are privately owned). Thus, the role of private actors
in the process, whether it is a comprehensive global treaty-making
process or some set of polycentric processes, should not be underestimated. Improving levels of trust and cooperation among the
individuals who are decision-makers within private enterprises,
with both policy advocates and those who establish and implement
government policy, would be advantageous for climate policy. To
that end, the WBCSD’s positive interactions with climate scientists
and various environmental groups provide a useful and replicable
working model.

Conclusion

If any realistic policy solution (or set of policy solutions) to the
climate change problem requires the development of higher levels
of mutual trust among the relatively small number of major emitting parties, then how quickly can that happen? The honest answer
is probably not quickly enough to avert the need for fairly high
levels of adaptation and/or geoengineering. Ostrom45 observes that
mutual trust is “an asset that individuals build over time by engaging
in mutually beneficial transactions that cannot be consummated in
an immediate quid pro quo exchange.” Certainly, the evidence of
more than 20 years of UN climate meetings is that little mutual
trust has developed so far. Indeed, a review of contemporaneous
accounts from recent global climate meetings indicates continuing
high levels of distrust, represented not only by lack of progress on
mitigation but also by well-publicized conflicts among parties. A
headline from the meeting in Warsaw (November 2013) makes the
point well: “Bitter recriminations highlight climate-summit rift”46.
That subglobal negotiations and agreements might not reduce
GHG emissions rapidly enough to forestall the need for adaptation and/or geoengineering is no reason to maintain an exclusive
focus on global policies that have failed and global negotiations
that remain stalled. To the contrary, a polycentric approach to climate governance might provide the best chance we have of accelerating progress toward global climate stabilization by providing
more frequent and varied opportunities for major emitting parties
to engage in face-to-face communications in bilateral and multilateral fora, including some outside the intense glare of the public
spotlight. Those interactions, some of which the UN might even
facilitate, could inculcate the kind of mutual trust that seems necessary for greater cooperation at the global level. Thus, a broader
focus on bilateral and smaller-scale multilateral negotiations might
be not only desirable; it could be a necessary condition for more
successful negotiations in the global, UN-based process. As Prins
and Rayner 47 have observed, no silver bullet exists to solve the climate change problem, but a ‘silver buckshot approach’ might work.
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